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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
The state appeals from the district court’s order suppressing evidence obtained
pursuant to a search of a vehicle. The state contends that the district court erred when it
determined the automobile exception was inapplicable because the occupant of the
vehicle claimed she did not have the keys to the vehicle on her person.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
At around 11:00 p.m. on September 24, 2016, Officer Mongan was driving in a
residential area when he saw a female sitting in the driver’s seat of a parked Toyota RAV4. (4/7/17 Tr., p. 20, L. 18 – p. 22, L. 23, p. 23, Ls. 8-14.) The female was trying to duck
down in her seat in an apparent attempt to hide. (4/7/17 Tr., p. 20, L. 18 – p. 22, L. 23.)
Officer Mongan made contact with the female, who was later identified as Michaela
Morton. (4/7/17 Tr., p 24, L. 14 – p. 25, L. 15.) Ms. Morton had trouble focusing, had
dilated pupils, and appeared to be under the influence of drugs. (Id.)
Ms. Morton admitted she was on felony probation for burglary. (See Ex. 3 at
1:22-1:27. 1) Ms. Morton explained to Officer Mongan that the RAV-4 was her mom’s
car but that she uses it a lot and was borrowing the car for the weekend. (See Ex. 3 at
2:30-2:54.) Ms. Morton said her friend, Larry, had driven her to this location and he had

1

Exhibit 3 is the unredacted version of the recording made from Officer Mongan’s body
camera. (See 4/7/17 Tr., p. 37, L. 22 – p. 41, L. 17.) Exhibit 2, a redacted version of the
recording was rejected by the district court; however the parties stipulated to the
admission of Exhibit 3, the unredacted version of the recording. (See id.) Exhibit 3 is
labeled as “1170952.avi.” The time references in Exhibit 3 are approximations made for
ease of reference.
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gone inside the house. (4/7/17 Tr., p. 26, L. 6 – p. 27, L. 14.) There was some confusion
about who had actually driven the car. (See id.)
Officer Mongan asked Ms. Morton for consent to search her person and her
vehicle. (4/7/17 Tr., p. 25, L. 16 – p. 26, L. 5.) Ms. Morton gave consent to search both
her car and her person. (Id.; see also Ex. 3 at 3:17 – 4:06.) During the search of the
vehicle Officer Mongan found a small purple pill container containing a white crystalline
substance. (4/7/17 Tr., p. 27, Ls. 15-21, p. 48 L. 16 – p. 49, L. 21, p. 55, L. 3 – p. 56, L.
19; see also Ex. 3 at 10:58 – 11:45.) This pill container was, based upon Officer
Mongan’s training and experience, consistent with drug paraphernalia. (See id.)
During this time when Officer Mongan was searching the car he also tried to
determine what had happened to Ms. Morton’s friend, Larry, and where he had gone after
he had gone inside the house. (See Ex. 3.) Officer Mongan asked Ms. Morton where the
keys to the vehicle were, and she indicated she was not sure, but they were probably
inside the house. (See Ex. 3 at 7:23 – 7:30; see also 4/7/17 Tr., p. 47, Ls. 1-3.)
Eventually, Officer Mongan searched the trunk of Ms. Morton’s vehicle. (4/7/17
Tr., p. 32, L. 22 – p. 34, L. 24.) Officer Mongan found three backpacks in the trunk. (Id.)
Inside the large black backpack, Officer Mongan found a pill bottle bearing the name of
“Larry Penkunis.” (Id.) There were also two safes inside the large black backpack. (Id.)
Officer Mongan requested a canine to come to the scene. (Id.) The canine alerted on the
vehicle. (Id.) Officer Mongan seized, but did not open, the two safes. (Id.) Officer
Mongan collected the two safes and transported them to the police department. (Id.)
Two days later, on September 26, 2016, the Kootenai County Sheriff’s office
began investigating the death of Ms. Morton. (4/7/17 Tr., p. 68, L. 6 – p. 73, L. 10; see
2

also R., p. 234.) Detective Hildebrandt obtained a search warrant for the two safes that
were seized by Officer Mongan (Id.) Detective Hildebrandt identified the two safes as a
large black safe and a smaller lockbox. (Id.) Detective Hildebrandt had to force the safes
open. (R., p. 17.) In the large black safe Detective Hildebrandt found small Ziploc
baggies and an electronic scale, both of which are commonly used in the distribution of
controlled substances. (4/7/17 Tr., p. 74, L. 16 – p. 75, L. 9.) There was also a Kootenai
County Sherriff’s business card with a case number that referred to a traffic accident
involving Larry Penkunis. (Id.) In the lock box, Detective Hildebrandt found a digital
scale, a glass meth pipe, syringes, suboxone pills and a plastic bag containing
approximately 7 grams of methamphetamine. (4/7/17 Tr., p. 75, Ls. 10-18.)
The state charged Penkunis with possession of a controlled substance with intent
to deliver, with a habitual offender enhancement. (R., pp. 47-49.) Penkunis filed a
motion to suppress arguing that the search of the vehicle was unconstitutional. (R., pp.
56-69.) The state responded. (See 11/9/17 Order Granting Motion to Augment the
Appellate Record.) The district court held a hearing on the motion to suppress. (R., pp.
161-166.) At the hearing, Penkunis testified he was not the driver of Ms. Morton’s
vehicle. (4/7/17 Tr., p. 9, Ls. 12-21.) Penkunis said he did not have keys to the vehicle.
(Id.) Penkunis admitted he left his bags and the lock box and safe in her car the day
before. (4/7/17 Tr. p. 10, L. 9 – p. 12, L. 15.) Officer Mongan, Detective Hildebrandt
and Parole Officer Johnson also testified. (R., pp. 161-166.) The state and Penkunis filed
additional briefing after the hearing. (R., pp. 175-183, 186-192.)
The district court granted Penkunis’ Motion to Suppress. (R., pp. 231-242.) The
district court found, first, that Ms. Morton’s vehicle was not stopped by Officer Mongan
3

and the initial encounter was consensual. (R., p. 236.) The district court also ruled that
Penkunis had not abandoned the backpacks seized by Officer Mongan. (R., pp. 236-237.)
The district court also determined that Ms. Morton did not have the actual or apparent
authority to consent to the search or seizure of the backpacks. (R., pp. 237-238.)
Finally the district court examined the automobile exception. (R., pp. 238-241.)
The court found that Officer Mongan “may have had probable cause to believe that the
vehicle in question contained contraband based on his finding of what he believed to be
drug paraphernalia on the vehicle’s front seat.” (R., p. 239.) However, the court found
that the search of Penkunis’ backpacks was not justified by the automobile exception
because the vehicle was not “readily mobile” because “[t]he most persuasive evidence
here is that Penkunis had the keys to the vehicle and [Ms.] Morton was therefore unable
to drive it.” (R., p. 239.)
The district court concluded that, even though Detective Hildebrandt obtained a
warrant to search the lockbox and safe (which were in the backpacks) those backpacks
were themselves illegal seized by Officer Mongan, and thus the contents of the backpack
were to be suppressed. (R., pp. 240-241.) The state timely appealed. (R., pp. 244-259.)
The district court entered a stay pending the outcome of the appeal. (R., p. 263.)

4

ISSUE
Did the district court err by concluding the automobile exception did not apply
because the occupant of the car claimed to not have the keys to the car?

5

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Ruled That Ms. Morton’s Vehicle Was Not Readily
Mobile Because Ms. Morton Said She Did Not Have The Keys
A.

Introduction
The district court found that the automobile exception did not justify Officer

Mongan’s search of the backpacks that were in the trunk of Ms. Morton’s car because
Ms. Morton said she did not have the keys and, thus, the vehicle was not “readily
mobile.” (See R., pp. 238-241.) The district court erred. The location of, or access to,
the vehicle’s keys is not determinative of whether a vehicle is “readily mobile.” Correct
application of the law to the facts shows the automobile exception is applicable. Pursuant
to the automobile exception, both the discovery of paraphernalia in the car, and the canine
alert, gave Officer Mongan probable cause to seize and search the backpacks and safes.

B.

Standard Of Review
In reviewing an order denying a motion to suppress evidence, this appellate court

applies a bifurcated standard of review. State v. Anderson, 154 Idaho 703, 302 P.3d 328
(2012) (citing State v. Purdum, 147 Idaho 206, 207, 207 P.3d 182, 183 (2009)). This
appellate court will accept the trial court’s findings of fact unless they are clearly
erroneous but will freely review the trial court’s application of constitutional principles to
the facts found. Id.

C.

The District Court Incorrectly Applied The Law To The Facts In Concluding That
The Automobile Exception Was Inapplicable
The state does not challenge the district court’s factual findings, but challenges the

district court’s application of law. The district court erroneously held that the automobile
6

exception did not apply based on its finding that the vehicle was not “readily mobile”
because Ms. Morton claimed she did not have the keys to the car. (R., pp. 238-241. 2)
“Under the long-recognized automobile exception, police officers having probable cause
to believe that an automobile contains contraband or evidence of a crime may search the
automobile without a warrant.” State v. Loman, 153 Idaho 573, 575, 287 P.3d 210, 212
(Ct. App. 2012) (citing Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999); State v.
Gallegos, 120 Idaho 894, 897-898, 821 P.2d 949, 952-953 (1991); State v. Johnson, 152

2

The district also noted the “curious fact” that the search of the safe and lock box,
pursuant to a warrant, occurred three days after they were seized. (See R., pp. 239-241.)
While the district court attempted to distinguish United States v. Johns, 469 U.S. 478
(1985), the district court never held any delay in the search was, by itself,
unconstitutional. (See id.) Nor did the district court provide any authority to support that
proposition. (See id.) The district court only noted in conclusion that the search was
“unreasonably delayed and the direct fruit of the illegal seizure by [Officer] Mongan”
(See id.). Thus, the district court did not find any delay in the search of the safe and
lockbox was itself unconstitutional.
Even if the district court had made such a finding, it would have been error.
There is no requirement that the warrantless search of a container pursuant to the
automobile exception occur contemporaneously with its lawful seizure. See Johns, 469
U.S. at 486-487. Unless the owner of the packages can prove that the delay in the
completion of the search adversely affected legitimate interests protected by the Fourth
Amendment, there is no violation. See id. at 487-488. Here, the evidence shows
Penkunis fled the scene when he saw the officers arrive, and the officers seized his
backpacks (containing the safe and lockbox) pursuant to the automobile exception.
Penkunis was gone and the police were looking for him. It was reasonable for the
officers to seize the backpacks and get a warrant to open the safes. It was additionally
reasonable for the police not to search the safe and lockbox during the initial seizure
because they were locked and had to be forced open. (See R., p. 17.) The backpacks
were held in the police station until the police got a warrant to open the safe and lockbox.
Even if the district court found any delay unconstitutional, which it did not, such finding
would have been erroneous.
7

Idaho 56, 61, 266 P.3d 1161, 1166 (Ct. App. 2011); State v. Smith, 152 Idaho 115, 120,
266 P.3d 1220, 1225 (Ct. App. 2011); State v. Newman, 149 Idaho 596, 599, 237 P.3d
1222, 1225 (Ct. App. 2010)).

“The two primary justifications for the automobile

exception are mobility and a reduced expectation of privacy.” State v. Lovely, 159 Idaho
675, 677, 365 P.3d 431, 433 (Ct. App. 2016), review denied (Feb. 23, 2016) (citing
California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 392–393, (1985); State v. Gibson, 141 Idaho 277,
281–282, 108 P.3d 424, 428–429 (Ct. App. 2005)).
Here there is little question Officer Mongan had probable cause to search Ms.
Morton’s vehicle because of the drug paraphernalia and the canine alert. “Probable cause
is established when the totality of the circumstances known to the officer at the time of
the search would give rise—in the mind of a reasonable person—to a fair probability that
contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” State v. Anderson,
154 Idaho 703, 302 P.3d 328 (2012). “Probable cause is a flexible, common-sense
standard, and a practical, nontechnical probability that incriminating evidence is present
is all that is required.” Id. (citing Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742 (1983)). If
probable cause exists to believe a vehicle contains evidence of criminal activity, the
search of any area of the vehicle in which the evidence might be found is authorized.
Johnson, 152 Idaho at 61, 266 P.3d at 1166 (citing United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798,
820–21 (1982)). “It is well settled that, when a reliable drug-detection dog indicates that
a lawfully stopped automobile contains the odor of controlled substances, the officer has
probable cause to believe that there are drugs in the automobile and may search it without
a warrant.” State v. Gosch, 157 Idaho 803, 807, 339 P.3d 1207, 1211 (Ct. App. 2014)
(citing State v. Tucker, 132 Idaho 841, 843, 979 P.2d 1199, 1201 (1999); Gibson, 141
8

Idaho at 281, 108 P.3d at 428). Here, after Ms. Morton consented to a search of the
vehicle, Officer Mongan found what he believed to be drug paraphernalia in Ms.
Morton’s vehicle and a drug dog alerted on the vehicle. (See 4/7/17 Tr., p. 27, Ls. 15-21,
p. 34, Ls. 4-15, p. 48 L. 16 – p. 49, L. 21, p. 55, L. 3 – p. 56, L. 19; R., p. 239.) Thus, the
only question is whether Ms. Morton’s vehicle was “readily mobile.”

Based upon

applicable case law, Ms. Morton’s vehicle was readily mobile.
In Gosch, supra, the police executed a search warrant to search Gosch’s apartment
and his black Jeep. Gosch, 157 Idaho at 805, 339 P.3d at 1209. While the police were
executing the search warrant, a drug detection dog alerted on a sedan parked in Gosch’s
driveway. Id. The police searched the sedan and found cocaine and marijuana in the
sedan’s trunk. Id. Gosch was charged and he filed a motion to suppress. Id. The district
court denied the motion to suppress, and Gosch appealed. Id. at 805-806, 339 P.3d at
1209-1210. On appeal, the Idaho Court of Appeals first determined that the sedan was
outside the scope of the search warrant. See id. at 806-807, 339 P.3d at 1210-1211. The
Court of Appeals then examined whether the search of the sedan was lawful under the
automobile exception. See id. at 807-809, 339 P.3d at 1211-1213.
The Court of Appeals held that the alert by the drug dog provided probable cause
to believe the sedan contained controlled substances, and that the issue was whether the
sedan was “readily mobile.” See id. “[T]he test for whether a vehicle parked in a
residential area is mobile for purposes of the automobile exception is whether, viewed
objectively, there was any indication that the vehicle was not mobile.” Id. at 808-809,
339 P.3d at 1212-1213. “Absent some objective indicia of immobility, an automobile is
presumed to be mobile.” Id. at 809, 339 P.3d at 1213. The sedan was found stationary in
9

a place regularly used for residential purposes, and there was no indicia of immobility;
therefore, the sedan was properly searched under the automobile exception to the warrant
requirement. Id.
In making its determination the Idaho Court of Appeals relied, in part, upon a
Ninth Circuit case and an Eighth Circuit case. Id. (citing United States v. Hatley, 15 F.3d
856, 859 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Hepperle, 810 F.2d 836, 840 (8th Cir. 1987)).
In Hepperle, the FBI investigated the theft of three pairs of macaw birds.
Hepperle, 810 F.2d at 837. The neighbors reported that they saw a station wagon drive
through the neighborhood on the day of the bird theft. Id. During the investigation, the
FBI found the station wagon parked behind Hepperle’s residence. Id. at 838. The FBI
seized the station wagon. Id. A later search of the station wagon revealed incriminating
evidence of the bird theft. Id. On appeal, Hepperle argued, among other things, that the
automobile exception did not apply because the station wagon was in disrepair and
incapable of being moved.

Id. at 840.

The Eighth Circuit first noted that “ready

mobility” is not the only basis for the automobile exception and that, even in cases where
a vehicle is not readily mobile, the automobile exception still applied. Id. However, the
Eighth Circuit went on to explain that the station wagon’s alleged immobility was not
visibly apparent, and that officers are not required to ascertain the actual functional
capacity of the vehicle in order to satisfy the automobile exception. Id.
In this case, the vehicle’s alleged immobility was not visibly apparent.
The fourth amendment does not require that officers ascertain the actual
functional capacity of a vehicle in order to satisfy the exigency
requirement. The test is reasonableness under all the circumstances. This
court finds that it was reasonable in this case to assume that the vehicle
was readily mobile.

10

Id.
In Hatley, the police searched Hatley’s parked car, a Corvair, and found cocaine.
Hatley, 15 F.3d at 858. The Corvair was parked in his driveway and, according to
Hatley’s testimony, had been inoperable for four months. Id. On appeal, Hatley argued
that the automobile exception does not apply to an inoperable vehicle. Id. at 858-859.
The Ninth Circuit examined the vehicle’s “location, whether the vehicle is readily mobile
or instead, for instance, elevated on blocks, whether the vehicle is licensed, whether it is
connected to utilities, and whether it has convenient access to a public road” to determine
whether it came under the automobile exception. Id. (citing United States v. Hamilton,
792 F.2d 837, 842 (9th Cir. 1986); California v. Carney, 471 U.S. at 394 n. 3 (1985)).
The Ninth Circuit determined that, even though the Corvair was not actually mobile, it
was apparently mobile and thus subject to the automobile exception. Id. The Ninth
Circuit explained,
Though the Corvair was not actually mobile, it was apparently mobile.
There was nothing apparent to the officers to suggest the car was
immobile. It was not up on blocks, and there is no information in the
record to indicate the tires were flat or that wheels of the car were missing.
Id. “It would be unduly burdensome to require the police to establish that every car that
appeared to be mobile was indeed mobile before making the search.” Id. “We therefore
hold, as the Eighth Circuit has, that the Fourth Amendment does not require that officers
ascertain the actual functional capacity of a vehicle in order to satisfy the exigency
requirement.” Id. (citing Hepperle, 810 F.2d at 840).
If the inoperable vehicles in Gosch, Hepperle, and Hatley, were all found to be
“readily mobile” for the purposes of the automobile exception, then certainly Ms.

11

Morton’s vehicle also falls under the automobile exception. ---------See also Lovely, 159 Idaho
at 677, 365 P.3d at 433 (bus readily mobile even though defendant was not the driver).
Ms. Morton’s car had been driven that very day to the residential area, and unlike the car
in Gosch, there was an individual sitting in the driver’s seat. None of the factors cited by
the Ninth Circuit indicating immobility are present here. Ms. Morton’s vehicle was not
up on blocks, the wheels were not missing and it was not hooked up to any utilities. Ms.
Morton’s vehicle had ready access to a public road – it was driven and parked on a public
road. If the Fourth Amendment does not require the officers to ascertain the actual
functional capacity of the car, then it does not require them to find the keys to the car
before searching it.
The fact that Ms. Morton claimed the keys were in the house did not render her
vehicle immobile. If the presence of keys were necessary to make a vehicle readily
mobile, there is no way that the parked and unoccupied vehicles in Gosch, Hepperle, or
Hatley could be determined to be “readily mobile.” The district court erred when it found
Ms. Morton’s vehicle to be outside the scope of the automobile exception.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court reverse the district court’s decision to
suppress and this case be remanded for further proceedings.
DATED this 19th day of December, 2017.

/s/ Ted S. Tollefson________________
TED S. TOLLEFSON
Deputy Attorney General
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